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NOTES
Trusts of Personalty and Conflict of Laws
If all, or a clear preponderance, of the operative factors I of an inter
vivos 2 or testamentary 3 trust of personalty 4 are found within the con-
i. E. g., domicil of settlor, the situs of the trust res, the settlor's intent, the domicil
of the trustees, the place where the business of the trust is to be carried on, the place
of execution of the trust instrument, the provisions of the instrument, and the residence
of the beneficiaries. On this point see RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (934) § 297,
comment d; Swabenland, The Conflict of Laws in. Administration of Express Trusts
of Personal Property (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 438; Note (934) 89 A. L. R. 1023.
2. Construed as meaning a "living trust". "The constitutent act of creating a
living trust is the transaction of changing the title of the trust res from the settlor
to the trustee." 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) IOI8.
3. Trust created by testator's will. 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1022.
4. The term "personalty" is substituted for the term "movables" used by the
American Law Institute. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (934) § 294 et seq.
See discussion by Beale, Living Trusts of Movables in the Conflict of Laws (932)
45 HARv. L. REV. 969.
(36o)
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fines of a single state, the laws of that state will govern the validity 5 and
administration of such trusts. However, where important operative factors
are found within the confines of more than one state, and no one state has
a clear preponderance, conflict of laws questions arise. The cases indicate
that the question of what law shall govern the validity,6 and what law shall
govern the administration 7 of trusts of personalty, is far from settled.
For that reason, the sought-for advice of counsel cannot be given with any
degree of certainty. However, it is by no means clear that "certainty of
rule" is the result to be desired." This becomes apparent when it is realized
that the determination of the applicable law in each case is based upon an
evaluation of the operative factors involved therein, rather than upon any
one controlling factor."
The necessity of drawing a distinction between testamentary and inter
vivos trusts is fundamental. 10 Likewise, if a separate rule of law is to be
applied to questions of validity and to questions of administration," the
point at which the creation aspects of a trust end and the administrative
aspects begin, must be decided. In general, it is said that the creation
aspects of a trust end and the administrative aspects begin after title to the
trust property has passed to the trustee.12  Unfortunately, the cases do
not always make it clear whether the matter involved is one of validity or
of administration. 13 However, once having determined whether the matter
is to be considered as one of validity or of administration, and having
determined what rule of law shall apply to both, the further question arises
as to what effect, if any, a subsequent shift in the elements of the trust
has upon the law governing the validity, as well as-the administration of
the trust. As we shall see, the governing law is affected in both respects,
if there has been such a shift in the operative factors 14 to warrant the
conclusion that the trust is now substantially connected with a new juris-
diction.
I. QUESTION OF VALIDITY OF INTER Vivos TRUSTS OF PERSONALTY
The rule of law governing the validity of inter vivos trusts of person-
alty is by no means as well settled as the rule governing the validity of
5. The law governing the validity does not always govern the interpretation of
the trust instrument. "The meaning of the words used in an instrument creating a
trust of movables is, in the absence of controlling circumstances to the contrary, de-
termined in accordance with usage at the domicil of the settlor of the trust at the
time of the execution of the instrument which created it." RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1934) § 296. "The rule stated in this Section is applicable equally to trusts
created by will or by settlement inter vivos. . . ." Id. at comment a. The usage
at the settlor's domicil was held not to govern interpretation where a contrary intent
was apparent from the operative facts. Irving Trust Co. v. Natica, Lady Lister-
Kaye, 157 Misc. 32, 284 N. Y. Supp. 343 (Sup. Ct. 1935) ; Developments in the Lau-
Conflict of Laws (937) 50 HARv. L. REV. 1119, 1157.
6. Cavers, Trusts Inter Vivos and the Conflict of Laws (1930) 44 HA'. L.
REV. I61.
7. Swabenland, supra note I.
8. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem (1933) 47 HARV. L. REv.
173, 181 n. 16.
9. With the exception of the determination of the validity of testamentary trusts.
There, the law is well settled in favor of the testator's domicil. GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) 422.
Io. See Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 393, 187 N. E. 65, 70 (I933). See also
Cavers, supra note 6, at 163.
ii. As is the case. GOODRICH, loc. cit. supra note 9.
12. 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 7024.
13. E. g., see cases in Note (1934) 89 A. L. R. 7023.
14. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 15 A. (2d) 153 (Del.
Ch. 194o).
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testamentary trusts of personalty. 15 In varying degrees, validity has been
predicated, individually and conjunctively, upon the law of the settlor's
domicil, 16 the situs of the trust property,' 7 the intent of the settlor,1s the
place of administration, 9 the domicil of the trustee, 2 the place of execution
of the trust instrument,2' and, the domicil of the beneficiaries. 22  At one
I5. Cavers, supra note 6, at 167; see note 9 supra.
i6. Prior to 1933, New York authority favored the rule of determining the va-
lidity of an inter vivos trust of personalty by the law of the settlor's domicil. RE-
STATEMENT, CoNFLiCr OF LAWS, N. Y. ANN0"r. (935) §294. See Liberty Nat.
Bank & Trust Co. v. New England Investors Shares, Inc., 25 F. (2d) 493, 495 (D.
Mass. 1928) ; Swetland v. Swetland, 2O5 N. J. Eq. 6o8, 614, 149 At. 50, 53 (2930).
Contra: Hullin v. Faur6, i5 La. Ann. 622 (i86o); Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N. Y.
381, 187 N. E. 65 (1933); (933) 47 HAv. L. REV. 350, (1934) 32 Mic,. L. REV.
696.
z7. Bouree v. Trust Francais des Actions de la Franco-Wyoming Oil Co., 14
Del. Ch. 332, 127 Atl. 56 (Ch. 2924). Compare Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381,
87 N. E. 65 (I933),, with Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N. Y. 95, 9 N. E.
(2d) 792 (137), aff'g, 246 App. Div. 280, 285 N. Y. Supp. 478 (1st Dep't 1936);
Developents in the Law--Conflict of Laws (ig37) 50 HAv. L. REv. 2229, II56,
(2936) 84 U. oF PA. L. REV. goi; Cars, .supra note 8. See also RESTATEMENT,CoNFLict or LAws (2934) § 294; 2 BE.LE, op. cit. .rpra note 2, at bI1.
18. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 15 A. (2d) 153, 16i (Del.
Ch. 294o): ". . . the intent of the grantor with respect to the location of the trust,
and, therefore, as to the governing law, is controlling; and that such intent must be
determined from a consideration of all of the facts and circumstances . . . "; Hut-
chison v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 187 N. E. 65 (1933) (These two cases accord with
the second of the three rules advanced by Cavers: "(2) Where there is no such ex-
press declaration (of intention), the court should examine the facts of the transac-
tion and the circumstances surrounding it in an effort to ascertain and effectuate
any intent which is inferable therefrom." Cavers, milpra note 6, at 195.); Shannon
v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N. Y. 95, 9 N. E. (2d) 792 (2937) (compare first rule ad-
vanced by Cavers: "(i) an express declaration of intention as to the law desired by
the settlor to govern his trust may properly be respected where the state whose law
is so designated has a substantial connection with the transaction" Cavers, supra
note 6, at 195. However, can it be said that there was a substantial connection here?) ;
Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. New England Investors Shares, Inc., 25 F. (2d)
493 (D. Mass. 1928). "One cannot blind oneself to the weight placed on the intent
of the settlor with reference to the selection of the governing law." Cavers, mapra
note 6, at 191.
ig. See Robb v. Washington & Jefferson College, i85 N. Y. 485, 496, 78 N. E.
359, 363 (igo6). Contra: Fowler's Appeal, 225 Pa. 388, 27 Atl. 431 (1889) (an
express rejection of place of administration as the controlling factor). However,
this has been treated as an important operative factor in the determination of the law
governing validity in, e. g., Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 25 A.
(2d) 253 (Del. Ch. i94o); Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 187 N. E. 65 (1933)."A much more persuasive suggestion is to test the validity of a trust by the law
of the place of its administration." Cavers, supra note 6, at i9o.
2o. This has been treated as an important operative factor in the determination of
the law governing validity in, e. g., Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 15
A. (2d) 253 (Del. Ch. 294o) ; Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 187 N. E. 65 0933).
Domicil of trustee is also an important factor in determining the place of administration
of the trust. See RESTATEmExT, CoNFLIcr OF LAWS (2934) § 297, comment d; Swa-
benland, supra note i, at 449.
21. Included in the enumeration of determinative factors in, e. g., Mercer v.
Buchanan, 132 Fed. 501 (C. C. W. D. Pa. 1904). Dismissed, e. g., in Equitable Trust
Co. of New Nork v. Pratt, 227 Misc. 7o8, 193 N. Y. Supp. 252 (Sup. Ct. 1922), aff'd
on the opinion below, 2o6 App. Div. 689, 199 N. Y. Supp. 921 (1st Dep't 1923). This
test ". . . is too little related to the substance of the transaction. A document may
be executed anywhere; the place of execution may be wholly fortuitous or, worse still,
carefully selected to take advantage of a rule in a jurisdiction whose sole connection
with the transaction would be the fact of signing there." Cavers, supra note 6, at i9o.
See also Swabenland, supra note i, at 449.
22. Included in the enumeration of determinative factors in, e. g., Shannon v. Irving
Trust Co., 275 N. Y. 95, 9 N. E. (2d) 792 (1937). "This has found no favor with the
courts, nor does it merit any. The obvious objection that there may be several bene-
ficiaries is alone enough to render it unacceptable as a determinative in the choice of
law." Cavers, supra note 6, at i89. See also Swabenland, sitpra note i, at 449.
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time the prevailing rule, expressed by the maxim mobilia sequuntur per-
sonata,2" was to hold the validity of inter vivos trusts of personalty to be
governed solely by the law of the settlor's domicil.24 However, this is no
longer considered to be the controlling factor, 2 but rather an unimportant
determinative factor.26  The place of execution of the trust instrument and
the domicil of the beneficiaries, never controlling factors, have been ac-
corded little weight in the determination of the governing law.2? Upon
the other hand, the place of administration of the trust, once ascertained,
and the trustee's domicil,2 8 have been considered important determinative
factors .2  Likewise, the intent of the settlor has been greatly emphasized, 0
and has been especially favored by Cavers, who recognized its importance,3'
concluding, that the express intention of the settlor governs if the state
whose law is so designated has a substantial connection 32 with the transac-
tion,83 and in the absence of an express declaration, the intent is to be
inferred from the facts and surrounding circumstances. 84  However, it
would seem that if a substantial connection is required where an express
intent is found, the same result will be had where there is no express intent
and the operative factors are considered with a view to finding that state
with which the trust is substantially connected.
The American Law Institute has adopted the rule that the law of the
state of the situs of the trust res governs the validity of an inter vivos
trust.38 In other words, the Institute is making the situs of the trust res
23. "Movables follow the person." 2 BouvER, LAW DICTIONARY (15th ed. 1883)
193. 24. Beale, Equitable Interests in Foreign Property (1907) 20 HARV. L. REv. 382,
394. See note 16 supra.
25. See note 16 supra. See Hutchinson v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 393, 187 N. E. 65,
70 (I933).
26. As in Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N. Y. 95, 9 N. E. (2d) 792 (i937).
It is not considered as an operative factor by the American Law Institute, RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (934) § 297, comment d.
27. See notes 21, 22 supra.
28. The place of administration and the trustee's domicil generally coincide. 2
BEALF, op. cit. sipra note 2, at 1023.
29. See notes I9, 20 supra.
30. See note 18 supra.
31. ". . . (I) an express declaration of intention as to the law desired by the
settlor to govern his trust may properly be respected where the state whose law is so
designated has a substantial connection with the transaction. (2) Where there is no
such express declaration, the court should examine the facts of the transaction and the
circumstances surrounding it in an effort to ascertain and effectuate any intent which
is inferable therefrom. (3) In a wholly colorless transaction, the law of the place of
the administration should be applied." Cavers, supra note 6, at 195. Just exactly what
the third rule means would seem to be rather nebulous and uncertain.
32. See Note (igig) 19 COL. L. REv. 486. "Substantial connection" would seem
to mean a numerical preponderance of the relatively more important operative factors
within the confine of one state.
33. E. g., Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N. Y. 95, 9 N. E. (2d) 792 (1937).
Is settlor's domicil and domicil of beneficiaries in New Jersey, aside from settlor's ex-
press declaration of intent that New Jersey law govern, a sufficient number of relatively
important factors to say that the trust res was substantially connected with New Jer-
sey, when instrument executed, situs of trust res, trustee, and place of administration in
New York? See note 18 supra.
34. E. g., Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., i5 A. (2d) 153 (Del.
Ch. 1940) ; Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 187 N. E. 65 (1933). See note 18 supra.
35. "(I) . . . the validity of a trust of chattels created by a settlement or other
transaction inter vivos is determined as to each item by the law of the state in which
the particular chattel is at the time of the creation of the trust. (2) The validity of a
trust of choses in action created by a settlement or other transaction inter vivos is de-
termined by the law of the place where the transaction takes place." RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 294. See 2 BEALE, op. Cit. supra note 2, at ioig; GOOD-
RICH, loc. cit. supra note 9. See note 4 supra.
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the controlling factor in the determination of validity, thus holding contrary
to the development of the law upon this point, i. e., that the situs of no one
particular element governs, but rather the law of the state in which is found
a preponderance of the relatively more important factors.36 Hutchison v.
Ross 37 apparently adopted the rule of the American Law Institute. In
that case, the settlor, a domiciliary of Quebec, executed a trust agreement
in Quebec, the trust res, trustee, and place of administration of which were
in New York. By Quebec law the trust was invalid, but valid by New
York law. The New York court held that their law governed the validity
since an intent that New York law should govern was inferable from the
operative factors present in that state. Cavers indicated that to cite this
case as following the "situs of the res" rule of the Restatement would be
unwise, but rather the case should stand as an evaluation of the operative
factors involved therein.38  That the Hutchison case did not manifest a
whole-hearted adoption of the Restatement rule was seen in the subsequent
decision of Shannon v. Irving Trust Co.' 9 In that case, settlor, a New
Jersey domiciliary, as were the beneficiaries, executed a trust agreement
in New York naming a New York trustee and providing that the trust
was to be administered there, trust res to be delivered there, and that New
Jersey law should govern the trust. By New York law the trust was
invalid, but valid by New Jersey law. The New York court held that
New Jersey law, the law intended by the settlor, governed the validity.
The Restatement rule, "situs of the res", was clearly not followed. Cavers
would allow the express intention of the settlor to govern provided the
trust was substantially connected to the state whose law was so desig-
nated.4 0  However, the location of the trustee, trust res, and place of
administration in New York would indicate that the trust was substan-
tially connected to New York and not New Jersey.4' And it would seem
that the law of the state to which the trust is substantially connected should
govern even if it conflicts with the intent of the settlor.42 By this decision,
express intent of the settlor is the controlling factor.
As the law now stands, the validity of an inter vivos trust of person-
alty is determined by a consideration of the operative factors, a numerical
preponderance of which, weighted in accordance with their relative im-
portance, controls, rather than any one particular element. No case can
be cited with accuracy for any general rule, each case being a weighing of
the operative factors involved.43  In other words, the courts are not fol-
36. See Cavers, supra note 6; Note (934) 89 A. L. R. 1o23.
37. 262 N. Y. 381, 187 N. E. 65 (933), 89 A. L. R. 1007, 1023 (1934), (933) 47
HAv. L. REV. 350, (934) 32 MicH. L. Rav. 696. See note i6 supra.
38. "I predict, however, that this decision will very generally be taken to confirm
. . . the Conflict of Laws Restatement that the law of the situs governs the validity
of an inter vivos trust of personalty. This simplication will, I believe, utterly distort
the decision. . . . This distortion will be the consequence of the search for a juris-
diction-selecting rule and of the premium placed upon certainty in this field. . . . If
the case were confined to the circumstances which gave rise to it, its significance as the
basis of a rule would be greatly circumscribed. Its significance as an evaluation of the
various factors involved therein would, however, remain, and as such its contribution
to the law would be of very considerable value." Cavers, supra note 8, at 182, n. 16.
39. 275 N. Y. 95, 9 N. E. (2d) 792 (937), aff'g, 246 App. Div. 280, 285 N. Y.
Supp. 478 (1st Dep't 1936), Developments in the Law-Conflict of Laws (1937) 50
HARv. L. REv. I9ig, ii56, (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 901.
40. See note 31 supra.
41. Especially in view of the relative unimportance of the factors of domicil of the
settlor and domicil of the beneficiaries.
42. See note 32 spra.
43. Goomu cn, op. cit. supra note 9, at 424; Cavers, supra note 6, at 195; Note
(r934) 89 A. L. R. io23, 1o24.
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lowing "the situs of the res" rule of the/ Restatement, but are determining
validity by the same process as outlined by the American Law Institute to
ascertain the location of the place of administration of an inter vivos trust.
44
This process is clearly illustrated in considering the question as to
whether shifts in the factual connections between the time of creation of
the trust and the bringing of the action affect the law governing the validity
of the trust. Such was the problem raised in the important Wilmington
Trust Co. case. 45 By an inter vivos trust of securities, created in i92o in
New York with all operative factors occurring there (trust res, domicil
of settlor, trustee, and beneficiaries), the settlor, granted to his son Joseph,
as a life beneficiary, general and special powers of appointment. In 1924,
with the consent of the settlor, a Delaware trust company was appointed
successor trustee pursuant to a general provision of the trust deed,4 6 and
all of the property then held by the New York trustee was transferred to
it along with additional securities. In 1929, Joseph, in the exercise of the
power of appointment, by an instrument specifically referring to the power,
appointed his two children beneficiaries. On first hearing,47 it was held
that the equitable life interests in the children of Joseph were valid under
Delaware law and were not void because of remoteness. Upon second
hearing,48 the point was raised that the equitable life interests in the
children of Joseph were void under New York law, and that the validity
of the appointed trusts was governed by New York law, since it was argued
that that law governed the validity of the trust of 192o. The court held
that the question of what law governed the validity of the trust of 1920
was to be determined by the settlor's intent, to be inferred from the facts
and surrounding circumstances.49 Since all of the operative factors were
present in New York at the creation of the trust, the law of that state was
held to govern questions concerning the validity of the trust.50  Whereas
the distribution of funds by the trustee under a power of appointment can
be considered as a question of administration,5 ' the validity of the appointed
trusts is to be governed by the law governing the validity of the trust
instrument.52  However, the court indicated that the law governing the
administration of the trust had shifted to Delaware. 53  Upon third hear-
ing,5. the court held that the appointment in 1924 of a successor trustee
in Delaware pursuant to a provision of the trust instrument, with the
44. R sTATEm NT, CONFLICr OF LAWS (1934) § 297, comment d.
45. 18o Atl. 597 (Del. Ch. 1935), rehearing, 186 Atl. 9o3 (Del. Ch. 1936), Develop-
mnents in the Law-Conflict of Laws (r937) So HARV. L. REV. 1119, II56, (1937) 25
GEo. L. J. 464; second rehearing, I5 A. (2d) 153 (Del. Ch. 294o).
46. "A majority of the adult beneficiaries hereunder shall have the right, subject to
the approval of the Donor during his lifetime . . . to change from time to time the
Trustee hereunder, or under any of said separate trusts, to any successful trust com-
pany (of any State) that has been in business not less than ten (to) years and has
capital and surplus of not less than One Million Dollars. . . ." Wilmington Trust
Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., I5 A. (2d) 153, i6o (Del. Ch. 294o).
47. i8o Atl. 597 (Del. Ch. 1935).
48. 186 Atl. 903 (Del. Ch. 1936).
49. See Cavers' second rule, note 31 supra.
So. "Since there was a substantial contact with Delaware, the court might have ap-
plied the law of that state to uphold the appointed trusts." Developments in the Law-
Conflict of Laws (937) 5o HARV. L. Ray. 1iug, 1157.
51. See Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 15 A. (2d) 153, 162 (Del.
Ch. 1940).
52. It is to be noted that the Delaware court treats ". . . the execution of a
power . . . as the act of the donor done through the appointee as his agent. .. ."
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., I86 Atl. 903, 907 (Del. Ch. 1936).
53. See Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., r86 Atl. 903, 910 (Del.
Ch. 1936).
54- 15 A. (2d) 153 (Del. Ch. 1940).
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settlor's consent, accompanied by a transfer of the trust res, clearly indi-
cated an intention that the trust be administered in Delaware, and also, the
intention, in view of the presence of these operative factors in Delaware,
that the law of that state should govern the validity of the trust instrument
of 1920. It was as though the trust had been "recreated" by the settlor in
Delaware.55 In view of the provision in the trust instrument providing
for the changing of trustee, and the settlor's consent to such a change, the
court had little difficulty in finding an intent upon the part of the settlor to
have the law governing the validity and administration shift with the
accompanying shift of operative factors.
The problem of whether the law governing the validity of a trust may
change with a subsequent shift in operative factors, is not covered by the
American Law Institute. The broad doctrine of the Wilmington Trust Co.
case, that a subsequent shift may operate to bring about a change in the
governing law, would seem to be a logical holding. Practically speaking,
the courts in their evaluation of the operative factors in each case are
striving to locate the state to which the trust is most substantially con-
nected. Hence, it would logically follow that when the operative factors
are changed so that the trust is now substantially connected with another
jurisdiction, the law of that jurisdiction should prevail.
II. QUESTION OF ADMINISTRATION OF INTER VIVOS tRUSTS OF
PERSONALTY
Having once determined the validity of an inter vivos trust, the ques-
tion arises as to what rule of law governs the administration. Generally,
questions which have no relation to the trustee's original title, such as, the
powers and duties of the trustee, and the rights of the beneficiaries, are
properly considered as administrative matter.56 As to what law governs
such matter, the American Law Institute has promulgated the rule that
the administration of the trust is determined by the law of the situs or seat
of the trust, i. e., where the trust instrument locates the administration of
the trust,5 7 which in the absence of an express intention, is determined by
a consideration of the operative factors involved.58  And by a consideration
of the operative factors involved is probably meant the determination of
the place with which the trust has its most substantial connection,5" which
in turn is determined by a numerical preponderance of the relatively more
55. Id. at 164.
56. "The administration by the trustee is the action of the trustee in carrying out
the duties of the trust. In what securities can he invest? What interest should he
receive on investment? To whom shall he pay the income? To whom shall he render
an account? . . . Whether the beneficiary may assign his interest. . . . Whether
the beneficiary may terminate the trust. . . ." RFSTATEMENT, CoN rLcr OF LAWS
(934) § 297, comments a, b, c. See GooDRIcH, op. cit. supra note 9, at 424, 425; Beale,
supra note 4, at 972.
57. "A trust of movables created by an instrument inter vivos is administered by
the trustee according to the law of the state Where the instrument creating the trust
locates the administration of the trust." RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934)
§ 297. See 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1023; GOODmiCn, op. cit. supra note 9,
at 422; Beale, The Progress of the Law, i9s9-ip2o--The Conflict of Laws (192o) 34
HARv. L. Ray. 50, 52.
58. "In order to determine where the administration of the trust is located, con-
sideration is given to the provisions of the instrument, the residence of the trustees,
the residence of the beneficiaries, the location of the property, the place where the
business of the trust is to be carried on." RESTATEMENT, Co 1icr oF LAws (1934)
§ 297, comment d. See 2 BEALrE op. cit. supra note 2, at 1024.
59. Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 9, at 425; Note (i9gi) ig CoL- L. REv. 486.
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important factors within a particular state.60 This method of evaluating
the operative factors involved in each individual case to determine the law
governing the administration of the trust, has been the method followed
by the courts; 61 and in this respect the Restatement rule accords with the
actual holdings of the cases. If an express intent is found contrary to a
preponderance of the relatively more important factors found within a
single state, it would seem that the express intent should not govern; 62
but rather, govern only when a substantial connection between the trust
and state intended is found.63 Thus, intent of the settlor alone should not
be the controlling factor in the absence of "substantial connection".
Is the law governing the administration of the trust affected by shifts
in the factual connections between the time of the creation of the trust and
the bringing of the action? Subsequent to the creation of a trust a change
of domicil of the settlor,6' beneficiaries,63 trustee,66 or removal of the trust
property to another state,6 7 has been held not to affect the law governing
administration. However, since the place of administration of the trust
and the domicil of the trustee usually coincide,68 a subsequent removal of
the trustee to, or the appointment of a successor trustee in, another state
should be of importance in affecting the law governing the administration
of the trust. 9 The New Jersey court in Swetland v. Swetland,'
0 held that
where a trustee has changed his domicil, as to that portion of the trust res
which remains at the original situs of the trust, the law which originally
governed the administration still governs. It can easily be said that the
60. See note 32 supra.
61. Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 126 N. E. 461 (192o), Beale, The
Progress of the Law, s919-.92o--The Conflict of Laws (1920) 34 HAtv. L. REv. 50,
53; Curtis v. Curtis, i85 App. Div. 391, 173 N. Y. Supp. io3 (ist Dep't 1918) ; Port-
land Trust & Savings Bank v. Rosenberg, 183 Wash. 681, 49 P. (2d) 467 (1935)
["The administration of a trust of a mortgage on Washington land (treated as per-
sonal property . . .) was held located in Oregon, where the mortgage was executed,
the bonds were validated, the trustee was domiciled, and the sinking fund and title
deeds were located in that state." RESTATEmENT, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS, WASH. ANNOT.
(940) § 297.]
62. Harvey v. Fiduciary Trust Co., 299 Mass. 457, 13 N. E. (2d) 299 (1938), 86
U. oF PA. L. REv. goo, (California domiciliary created a trust to be administered by
a Massachusetts trustee according to the law of that state, and at the same time
provided that payments of principal could be made on behalf of the beneficiaries, Ohio
domiciliaries, at the discretion of an Ohio probate court; trust res was in Massa-
chusetts. The Massachusetts court held that the Ohio court had no jurisdiction over
the trustee or trust res, and that Massachusetts law governed the administration in
its entirety). In conjunction with the Harvey case, see Beale's statement to the effect
that, "Although it is not generally understood, it must be clear that a trustee must be
responsible to the courts of one state only; otherwise, conflicting instructions and
differences as to accounts will make the administration of a trust impossibl.e. If one
court is to give instructions and orders to a trustee and to approve his accounts, that
court must clearly be one of the state of the seat of the trust. . . ." Beale, supra
note 4, at 973. Cf. Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N. Y. 95, 9 N1l. E. (2d) 792
(0937) (involves question of validity of inter vivos trust, not administration). See
also Swabenland, supra note i, at 450.
63. ". . . (i) an express declaration of intention as to the law desired by the
settlor to govern his trust may properly be respected where the state whose law is so
designated has a substantial connection with the transaction!" (Italics added.)
Cavers, supra note 31, at 195. This rule, although promulgated for the determination
of the validity of inter vivos trusts, may be applied by analogy to the determination
of the administrative law of inter vivos trusts, since the same process is followed.
64. Mercer v. Buchanan, 132 Fed. 5Ol (C. C. W. D. Pa. i9o4).
65. Ibid.
66. Swetland v. Swetland, 105 N. 3. Eq. 6o8, 149 At. 5o (Ch. 1930).
67. Matter of Avery, 45 Misc. 529, 92 N. Y. Supp. 974 (Surr. Ct. 1904).
68. 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1023; Cavers, mpra note 6, at i9o.
69. Swabenland, supra note I, at 448.
70. io5 N. J. Eq. 6o8, 149 Atl. 5o (Ch. 193o).
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mere removal of the trustee to another state, in itself, did not substantially
connect the trust with that state, or bring about such a preponderance of
operative factors in that state that an intent to change the administrative
law was inferable. Then, too, it is to be remembered that New Jersey
applies domiciliary law to determine the validity of inter vivos trusts.71
Upon the other hand, in the Wilmington Trust Co. case,"2 the subsequent
appointment of a successor trustee in Delaware in pursuance of a provision
in the trust instrument providing for such, accompanied by a transfer of
the trust res, was held to indicate clearly an intent to have the law govern-
ing the administration of the trust shift with the trustee and the trust res.
Here, there was such a shift of important operative factors to Delaware to
indicate that the trust was now substantially connected with that state.
Hence, in determining the place of administration of an inter vivos
trust the courts are evaluating the operative factors involved therein and
selecting that jurisdiction which would seem to be most substantially con-
nected with the trust from a standpoint of conjunction of important oper-
ative factors. Whether an express declaration of intent contrary to such a
conjunction of factual elements will prevail is not at all settled, but the
better view would seem to be that it should not. Thus, as in the case of
determining the validity of an inter vivos trust, no one element is con-
trolling. As seen by the Wilmington Trust Co. case, a subsequent shift
in the operative factors so as to bring about a change in the jurisdiction to
which the trust is substantially connected, may operate to change the law
governing the administration as well as validity.
III. QUESTION OF VALIDITY OF TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS OF PERSONALTY
Where operative factors are to be found in jurisdictions other than
the one in which the testator is domiciled, it is well settled that the validity
of a testamentary trust of personalty is to be determined by the law of the
settlor's domicil. 73  In certain cases however, 74 when the trust is to be
administered in a state other than the testator's domicil, and the validity
of the trust depends, not upon the creation, but whether the trust can be
validly carried out at the place of administration,75 there is some disagree-
ment as to what law should govern the ialidity. Some courts (domiciliary)
71. Id. at 614, 149 Ati. at 53.
72. 15 A. (2d) 153 (Del. Ch. 1940).
73. Hoglan v. Moore, 219 Ala. 497, 122 So. 824 (1929) ; Whitney v. Dodge, io5
Cal. 192, 38 Pac. 636 (894) (see note 77 infra) ; Hussey v. Sargent, II6 Ky. 53, 75
S. W. 222 (1903); McCurdy v. McCallum, 186 Mass. 464, 72 N. E. 75 (1904);
Rosenbaum v. Garrett, 57 N. J. Eq. 186, 41 Atl. 252 (1898) ; Cross v. United States
Trust Co., 131 N . Y. 330, 30 N. E. 125 (2892) (see note 77 infra); Despard v.
Churchill, 53 N. Y. 192 (1873). Contra: In re Chappell's Estate, 124 Wash. 128, 213
Pac. 684 (923) (held that the law intended by testator governed. See RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS, WASH. ANNOT. (2940) § 295).
This is the position taken by the American Law Institute: "The validity of a
trust of movables created by a will is determined by the law of testator's domicil at
the time of his death." RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 295. See 2
BEALE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2O22; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 9, at 422.
"Since such a trust derives its legal significance solely from the will, and since
the validity of the will, it is well settled, is dependent upon the law of the domicil, the
result seems proper enough." Cavers, supra note 6, at 263.
74. For limitations to the rule that testator's domicil governs, see notes 76, 77
infra. See Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 391, 187 N. E. 65, 69 (r933) : "With
possible limitations . . . (Cf. Chamberlain v. Chamberlain . . . ; Hope v. Brewer
; Cross v. United States Trust Co.), the rule is well established that the essen-
tial validity of a testamentary trust must be determined by the law of the decedent's
domicil ..
75. See 2 BEALE, op. cit. mipra note 2, at io22; Cavers, supra note 6, at I65, 166.
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take the logical view that if the trust is invalid under the law of the testa-
tor's domicil but valid at the place of administration, the validity of the
trust is to be governed by the law of the place of the administration" since
the public policy of that state has not been violated. The illogical view
is also taken that if the trust is valid under the laws of the testator's iomicil
but invalid at the place of administration, the courts of the place of adminis-
tration will uphold the trust.
77
IV. QUESTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS OF
PERSONALTY
Assuming that a testamentary trust has been validly created, what rule
of law is then to be applied to questions concerning the administration of
the trust? Beale early took the view that since the place of administration
would ordinarily be the testator's domicil, the law of that place would
govern regardless of the domicil of the trustees or beneficiaries.78 Cook,
after a study of the Lozier case,79 in which a New York trustee was held
accountable in the probate court of Ohio, the state of the testator's domicil,
came to the conclusion that a better result would have been achieved by
the adoption of "the rule of the jurisdiction with which, on the whole, the
trust seems to have the most substantial connection"., 0 Beale subsequently
took the view that the law of the testator's domicil governed, "unless a
contrary intention appears, as by naming a foreign trust company as
trustee"."" And, this view has been substantially adopted by the American
76. State, for Use of Woodlands Cemetery Co. of Philadelphia v. Lodge, I6 A.
(2d) 250 (Del. Super. Ct. 794o) (". . the question is of legitimate interest only to
the state where the property is to be received and held.") ; Vansant v. Roberts, 3 Md.
iig (1852); Hope v. Brewer, 136 N. Y. 126, 32 N. E. 558 (1892); Chamberlain v.
Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424 (1871).
77. Cross v. United States Trust Co., 131 N. Y. 330, 3o N. E. 125 (1892). In
this situation, Cavers takes the view that the courts of the place of administration
should refuse to give effect to the trust, as well as the courts of the domicil. Cavers,
supra note 6, at I65. On the latter point see also, Whitney v. Dodge, io5 Cal. 192, 38
Pac. 636 (1894) (". . . the rule rests upon comity and . . . the law of the owner's
domicil will not govern if the place where the property is has abrogated that law or
has a public policy against it." REsTATEmENT, CoNlicT OF LAws, CAL. ANNOr.
(1939) § 295.)
78. Beale, Equitable Interests in Foreign Property (I9O7) 2o HARv. L. Ray.
382, 395.
79. Lozier v. Lozier, 99 Ohio St. 254, 124 N. E. 167 (1919) (trustees and trust
res in New York; testator domiciled in Ohio).
8o. Note (I919) i9 CoL L. REV. 486. Swabenland criticized this rule upon the
ground that Cook "gives no suggestions as to how one is to determine which is the
place of 'most substantial connection' of a testamentary trust". Swabenland, supra
note I, at 441. Goodrich, in speaking of inter vivos trusts, states that, "Where no
intention is expressed, it would seem that the place where the trust is to be adminis-
tered would in general be that place with which it has the most substantial connec-
tion." GOODICH, op. cit. mpra note 9, at 425. By "substantial connection" it would
seem that Goodrich means a substantial preponderance of operative factors, as stated,
e. g., in RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS (1934) § 297, comment d, found in a single
state, weighted according to their relative importance. Absent an express statement
of intention, Goodrich would probably apply this same rule to testamentary trusts,
since he takes the view that the mere naming of a foreign trustee alone raises a pre-
sumption of intention that the law of the state designated governs the administration
of the trust, and the presence of additional operative factors within that state would
only tend to make the presumption conclusive. See note 92 infra. What is meant by"substantial connection" is practically the same thing as Beale's "seat of the trust"
which he holds to govern the administration of inter vivos and testamentary trusts.
2 BEALE, op. Cit. supra note 2, at 1023 et seq.
81. 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1024. Beale cites Keeney v. Morse, 71 App.
Div. 104, 75 N. Y. Supp. 728 (Ist Dep't 1902), as an example of a will showing a
contrary intention by naming a foreign trust company as trustee. In that case, New
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Law Institute, i. e., that the law of the testator's domicil governs "unless
the will shows an intention that the trust should be administered in another
state".82 The quoted portion is undoubtedly meant to correspond with the
phrase "where the instrument creating the trust locates the administration
of the trust",83 taken from the Restatement rule for determining the place
of administration of an inter vivos trust, which, as has been seen, is deter-
mined by a consideration of various operative factors.8 4  The American
Law Institute apparently desired to achieve the same result in the case of
the administration of testamentary trusts,85 i. e., that the law of the situs
of the trust determined by a consideration of the same operative factors
governs, although they did not say so in so many words. The meaning of
the Restatenzent rule in general would seem to be that there is only a pre-
sumption that testator intended the law of his domicil at the time of his
death to govern,8 6 which may be rebutted 87 by express intent or by an
intent inferable from the operative factors. 8 In the first place, the will
would show an intention to the contrary if the testator has made an express
declaration of intention that the law of a particular state shall govern. As
to whether an express declaration of intention will prevail, if a jurisdiction
is designated other than the one in which the trust is found to have its
situs, or substantial connection, is questionable. By analogy to the ad-
ministration of inter vivos trusts, it would seem that the express intent
should not prevail in this situation. 9 Secondly, the Restatement states
that "it may appear that the trust is located in another state than that of
the testator's domicil". 90 In other words, if sufficient operative factors
are found within a particular jurisdiction to infer that testator intended the
law of that state to govern the administration, the presumption in favor
of testator's domicil would be rebutted. Finally, there is a presumption,
which is rebuttable by the facts,91 that where a foreign trustee is named,
testator intended the law of the foreign trustee's domicil to govern. 92 Thus,
York law was held to govern the administration when the trustee, trust property,
place of administration were in New York as opposed to the Rhode Island domicil of
the testator.
82. "A testamentary trust of movables is administered by the trustee according
to the law of the state of the testator's domicil at the time of his death unless the will
shows an intention that the trust should be administered in another state." RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLicr OF LAWS (1934) § 298. See also GooRicH, op. cit. supra note 9, at
425; and see note 8o supra.
83. See note 57 supra.
84. See note 58 supra.
85. See Note (1938) 15 A. L. R. 8o2, 8o3.
86. "In the case of a testamentary trust, the state in which the testator intended
the trust to be administered is presumptively the state of the testator's domicil at the
time of his death, since it is natural to suppose that he intended the trust to be
administered in the same place in which his estate was to be administered, and under
the direction of the courts of that state." RESTATEMENT, CONFLicr OF LAws (1934)
§ 298, comment a.
87. See Cadbury v. Parrish, 89 N. H. 464, 466, 2oo AtI. 791, 792 (938). "Although
the state in which the testatrix intended the trust to be administered is presumptively
the state of her domicile at the time of her death . . . it should be borne in mind
that the will was made in Pennsylvania at a time when the testatrix was domiciled in
that state, that one of the trustees named by her was a trust company doing business
in Pennsylvania, and that the will was executed only a few years after the will by
which she acquired much of the stock in question had been construed by the Penn-
sylvania court." Cadbury v. Parrish, 89 N. H. 464, 466, 2oo AtI. 791, 792 (1938).
88. See notes 9o, 92 infra.
89. See note 62 supra.
9o. RESTATEmENT, CONFLcCT OF LAWS (1934) § 298, comment b.
91. Cronin's Case, 326 Pa. 343, 192 Atl. 397 (1937).
92. "If the testator appoints as trustee a trust company of another state, pre-
sumptively his intention is that the trust should be administered in the latter state;
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if there is no express intent to be found in the will, no intent inferable from
the operative factors, or if there is a presumption in favor of foreign trustee,
it is rebuttable, then and only then does the presumption of intent in favor
of testator's domicil become conclusive. In other words, as in the case of
the problem of the administration of inter vivos trusts, the situs of the
trust determined by all of the operative factors including intent, determines
the law governing the administration of the trust. 3
The problem of what facts may rebut the presumption of intention in
favor of the foreign trustee's jurisdiction was dealt with in a recent Penn-
sylvania decision. 4 In that case, the will of the testator, a New York
domiciliary, named a Pennsylvania trust company as trustee, and directed
that the trust res be delivered to it. By New York law, the trustee was
required to account to the New York court of probate, and also execute a
certificate appointing a designated New York agent as its attorney to re-
ceive service of process against it (the trustee) in any proceeding against
the estate. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that since the testatrix
had not provided otherwise, these facts rebutted the presumption of inten-
tion that testatrix intended Pennsylvania law to govern by virtue of her
appointment of a Pennsylvania trustee, and hence New York law governed
the administration.
Of importance is a recent New Jersey Chancery decision 95 which held
that the mere appointment of a foreign trust company as trustee did not
justify the presumption that the trust was to be administered under the
law there. In that case, a New Jersey domiciliary bequeathed $15,000 to a
Pennsylvania trust company as trustee, which it invested in participations
in a mortgage pool it had created. These were legal investments for Penn-
sylvania trustees but not for New Jersey trustees. Testator's will was
probated in New Jersey, and as a result of a controversy over which law
governed the legality of the investments, the New Jersey court held that
New Jersey law governed the administration of the trust, and that the
appointment of the foreign trustee in itself was of no effect. In so holding,
the New Jersey court is re-affirming the position taken by that state 16 prior
to the formulation of the Restatement rule and its presumption of intention.
The court stated that the law of testator's domicil governs the administra-
tion of the trust unless an express statement of intention to the contrary
appears in the will, or facts upon its face from which an inference of con-
trary intention can be drawn. 97 The latter statement of the court would
appear to be meaningless since the testator's naming of a Pennsylvania
trustee and the bequest to it would seem to be such facts as to indicate an
intention to have Pennsylvania law govern the administration. In view
of Cook's analysis of the Loaier case,9 these facts would indicate that the
trust should be held to be substantially connected to Pennsylvania. Upon
the other hand, the presumption of intention in favor of the foreign trustee's
the trust will, therefore, be administered according to the law of the latter state."
REsTATEENT, CoNtacr OF LAws (1934) §298, comment c.
93. See notes 85, 87 mtpra.
94. See note 91 supra.
95. In re Johnson's Estate, 127 N. J. Eq. 576, 14 A. (2d) 469 (Prerog. Ct. I94o).
96. Rosenbaum v. Garrett, 57 N. J. Eq. i86, 41 Ati. 252 (Ch. i898). In that
case, testator, a Pennsylvania domiciliary, by his will appointed a New Jersey trustee.
The New Jersey court held that Pennsylvania law governed the administration of the
trust.
97. See In rc Johnston's Estate, 127 N. 3. Eq. 576, 579, 14 A. (2d) 469, 471
(Prerog. Ct. 1940).
98. See note So supra.
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jurisdiction was sustained in a recent Wisconsin decision, 9 in which
testator, while a resident of Pennsylvania, named a Pennsylvania trust
company as trustee in his will, which provided that if his wife and children
predeceased him the trust fund should be distributed according to Penn-
sylvania intestate laws. Testator died a Wisconsin domiciliary, and the
court held that Pennsylvania law governed the administration of the trust.
Here, the factors indicating that Pennsylvania law should govern, in addi-
tion to the naming of a foreign trustee, apparently made the presumption
conclusive since clearly the situs of the trust was in Pennsylvania. How-
ever, if the situation were to arise that a foreign trustee was named and the
trust res not to be delivered to him, and no other operative factors were
to be found in the state of the foreign trustee,100 it is conceivable that then,
since the situs of the trust in that state, or substantial contact with that
state, could hardly be found, the presumption of intention would be held
not to operate, being rebutted by the operative facts. That the Restate-
ment rule would bring about this result, if properly interpreted, seems
likely.
Upon the basis of a survey made in 1936, Swabenland came to the
conclusion that what little authority there was to be found was contrary
to the view taken by the American Law Institute as to the rule of law
governing the administration of a testamentary trust.'0 ' "Instead of rely-
ing upon any single element for determining the governing law, the courts
in testamentary, as well as in inter vivos trusts seem to depend upon a
group of factors." 102 Swabenland's conclusion as to the holding of the
courts would seem to be accurate, 103 but his interpretation of the Restate-
ment rule would appear to be unduly narrow. As stated previously, the
Restatement rule, by different language, achieved the same result in the
administration of testamentary trusts as they did in inter vivos trusts.
That this is so is evident from the cases. For example, in Cadbury v.
Parrish,04 the New Hampshire court, although recognizing that pre-
sumptively the law intended to govern the administration of the trust is
that of the testatrix's domicil, which was New Hampshire in this case, held
that a preponderance of operative factors, one of which was a trustee, found
in Pennsylvania, overcame the presumption and Pennsylvania law gov-
erned. In Keeney v. Morse,09 where the domicil of the testator was in
Rhode Island, but substantially all of the operative factors (such as trustee
and trust res) were in New York, the New York court held that the law
of that state would govern the administration of the trust. Beale cited this
case as an example of a will showing a contrary intention by naming a
foreign trust company as trustee.10 6 Also, in view of the importance of the
situs of the trustee and the trust res, substantial contact with New York
can readily be found to substantiate the intention. Hence, this case would
readily fall under the Restatement rule. In Bank of New York v.
Slillito,
0 7 testator died domiciled in Massachusetts and his will was pro-
99. See In re Risher's Will, 227 Wis. 104, 112, 277 N. W. i6o, 163 (1938), Note
(1938) 115 A. L. R. 790, 796, 802.
ioo. Matter of Avery, 45 Misc. 529, 92 N. Y. Supp. 974 (Surr. Ct. 19o4).
Swabenland's brief of the case indicates that the appointment of a foreign trustee in
one state, was held not to prevail over a preponderance of the remaining operative
factors in another state. Swabenland, supra note I, at 449.
i. Swabenland, supra note 1, at 449.
1O2. Ibid.
1O3. Note (1938) 115 A. L. R. 802.
iO4. See note 87 supra.
105. 71 App. Div. 104, 75 N. Y. Supp. 728 (Ist Dep't 19o2).
io6. 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1024.
107. 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 458 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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bated there, but by the will he appointed a New York corporation as
trustee and directed that the trust res be turned over to it. The New York
court held that New York law governed the administration of the trust.
Here again the court determined the situs of the trust and applied that law
to the administration. And that the Restatement rule is in accord with the
decision cannot be denied.
Thus, as in the case of inter vivos trusts, the law of the situs of the
trust, determined by a consideration of the operative factors involved,
governs the administration of testamentary trusts. A subsequent shift in
factual connections, as the appointment of a successor trustee in another
state in accordance with a provision of the will,108 accompanied by a transfer
of the trust res to him, would clearly seem to change the location of the
trust. 0 9 In view of the Wilmington Trust Co. decision,110 such a shift
should result in a change in the law governing the administration of the
trust. However, it is highly unlikely that it would result in a change in
the law governing the validity of the trust in view of the well settled rule
that the law of the testator's domicil governs.
D. M. B.
Divestiture of Liens in Pennsylvania I
That one could transfer only the property interest he possessed was
fundamental at common law. Normally, this principle was applied to
sheriff's sales, permitting the interest of the debtor alone to be conveyed.
Under this axiom, a foreclosure sale under a prior lien operated to divest
all subsequent liens because they were subordinated; but a sale under sub-
sequent liens would be subject to prior liens. However, Pennsylvania
refused to follow this analysis, and adopted a view divesting prior as well
as subsequent liens at any such sale.2 This doctrine was applied even
though prior liens had not matured, and also, if the lien were matured,
even though the prior lienholder desired to maintain his lien under the
conditions prevailing at the time. From the earliest of decisions the avail-
ability of a market for foreclosure sales, and of purchasers at such sales,
far overbalanced in importance the interests of the party lienors. At a
time when so much of the common law revolved about protection to vested
io8. See In re Vanneck's Estate, 158 Misc. 704, 7o6, 286 N. Y. Supp. 489, 491
(Surr. Ct. 1936) (the situs of the administration of a testamentary trust created by a
testator domiciled in Canada, the trustee being a New York trust company appointed
by beneficiary in accordance with decedent's will, is in New York).
xO9. Cf. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 15 A. (2d) 153 (Del.
Ch. ig4o).
11o. Ibid.
1. Priorities are admitted for our purposes. To determine when priorities do exist
see Note, Priorities between Mortgages and Mechanics' Liens (1926) 36 YA.- L. J.
i29; Notes (1934) 22 CALIF. L. REV. 312, (2932) 17 IOWA L. REV. 516; (935) 23
CALIF. L. Ry. 636. Judicial sales and not private sales lie at the basis of this divesti-
ture note. In the case of private sales not even subsequent liens are discharged, for
Pennsylvania requires a sale by virtue of some writ of execution, or by decree or order
of court. Bruckman Lumber Company v. Pittsburgh Insurance Company, 3o7 Pa. 561,
162 Atl. 204 (2932), (1933) 7 TEMPLE L. Q. 377; Commonwealth v. Keystone Graphite
Company, 257 Pa. 249, ioI At. 766 (917), 248 Pa. 344, 93 Atl. 1071 (915); see
Foulke v. Millard, io8 Pa. 230, 235 (1885). Other jurisdictions are contra to Pennsyl-
vania and divest junior liens even though the sale is not through the court: Vines v.
Wilcutt, 212 Ala. 150, 102 So. 29 (1924) ; Metropolis Trust and Savings Bank v. Bar-
net, 165 Cal. 449, 132 Pac. 833 (913) ; see Howe v. Woodruff, 12 Ind. 214, 218 (1859).
2. The harshness of this divestiture policy is reduced because disbursement of pro-
ceeds resulting from foreclosure sales is in order of priority of lien.
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rights, the Pennsylvania reasoning represents a truly remarkable, and
startling departure.3 Evidently the Pennsylvania legislature realized this,
for it has through numerous statutes afforded protections to prior mortgage
liens under certain conditions.
Even at common law there are some deviations from this rule of com-
plete divestiture. Various interests such as ground rents and dower were
considered estates rather than liens and under that theory were saved.
Consequently a real problem arose under a sale by a lienholder whose lien
was subsequent to an estate interest and a mortgage lien: did these estates
which remained undivested at common law cause the divestiture of liens
immediately subsequent to them, when these latter liens were afforded
protection by statute only if they were prior to all others?
COMMON LAW ORIGIN AND STATUTORY MODIFICATIONS
The Pennsylvania rule, permitting property purchased at judicial sale
to pass into the hands of the purchaser clear of all liens, has an extremely
novel origin. It is traceable to cases early in the nineteenth century which
concerned themselves with sheriff poundage fees.4  The applicable statute
provided: "no poundage shall be paid [to the sheriff] for more than the
real debt in execution". The courts interpreted this statute to permit a
sheriff selling under a junior lien to secure fees based not only on the debt
represented by the lien, but on the total lien debt outstanding on the
property. The sheriff was also allowed to collect fees for having made
searches necessary to ascertain the existence of liens prior to the one for
which the sale was ordered. These decisions were very briefly written.
Therefore it is not too apparent whether or not prior liens were due or
that any objection to payment and discharge thereof were ever raised.
Thus these decisions appear far distant from divestiture of all liens. Yet,
it is these very cases that are later relied upon as the bulwark of the com-
mon-law rule. Therefore, it seems that these early shrewd sheriffs are
responsible for the present Pennsylvania rule. Only one case, 5 antedating
the sheriff cases by about ten years, casts doubt upon this suggested origin.
Here, a legacy charged upon the land was divested on a sale by the judg-
ment creditor of the devisee. It is doubtful whether that opinion can be
relied upon as authority. The opinion is very brief, was decided at nisi
prius, and twelve years afterwards the Supreme Court in Keen v. Swaize,6
without noting it, divided sharply over this question of a foreclosure sale
conveying free and clear. In this case, the court balancing the dangers of
impeaching a prior lienholder's security with the danger that the land sold
would not bring its full value, failed to reach a decision, saying: "There
are great dangers and mischiefs on both sides of the question; and it will
require great consideration before the court can lay down any general rule
on the subject." 7
This early history casts doubt upon language in cases as early as i81I
which said that selling clear of all liens "has been a practice of long stand-
3. For a bird's-eye view of the complete Pennsylvania picture see AMRAM, PENN-
SYLVANIA COMMON PLEAS PRACricE (1936) § iog. Other secondary authorities while
not nearly as thorough give a general discussion of the law: ROBEY, REAL ESTATE AND
CONVEYANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA (1922) § 205; 3 Ti
a
cz
r
r, LAW OF LIENS IN PENN-
SYLVANIA (1891) §§ i69-17I; Bolles, Discharge of Liens by Judicia Sale in Pennsyl-
vania (915) 63 U. OF PA. L. REV. 490, 498-499.
4. Wall v. Lloyd's Executors, I S. & R. 320 (Pa. 1815) ; Petry v. Beauvarlet, I
Binn. 97 (Pa. 1804); Shoemaker v. Houtford, I Browne's Rep. 251 (Pa. 1811);
Browne v. Brown, I Browne's Rep. 97 (Pa. i8og).
5. Nicholas v. Postlethwaite, 2 DalU. 131 (Pa. I79i).
6. 3 Yeates 561 (Pa. 1803).
7. Id. at 564.
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ing in this state".8 However, this policy was made definite in Pennsyl-
vania by Willard v. Norris." In spite of a reference to the early sheriff
poundage fee cases, the court believed the rule to have existed in this state
"beyond the memory of man". 10 Ignored or mentioned as falsely reported
were Febeiger's Lessee v. Craighead 11 and other early cases 12 which in
decision or dictum held that subsequent lienholders can sell their own
interests only. These latter cases reached their result upon logical reason-
ing from the common-law view that a man could sell only the interest he
owned. However, Willard v. Norris was strongly approved in Presby-
terian Corporation v. Wallace.'5 Of course this court too claimed that
this was a seventy-year-old practice not now to be disturbed. But the
same precedents relied upon in the Willard case were cited for support.1 4
The court went further and presented reasons to support this approach
were it regarded as one of first impression. 5 It was feared that a number
of sales would cause too much of the estate to be divided among the "re-
tainers of the law"; and that cost could only come out of the pockets of the
junior lien creditors who would otherwise have shared therein. In addi-
tion, the public interest at stake was tremendous and the reasoning was
that "even if a temporary hardship were experienced from this result in a
particular quarter, it would be greatly more than counterbalanced by the
permanent benefits that would result to the community at large". This
decision would also have the salutary result of causing men to cease invest-
ing in lands at a distance (as if that were an evil per se). Most important
of all, prior lienholders had to fear no possibility of sales at an under-
value, for that "would have become impracticable the moment it was ascer-
tained the purchaser was to have an unencumbered title". Today it is
recognized that this doctrine has fallen short of what it was desired to
achieve. Even in the absence of fraud it has become the custom to sell at
foreclosure sale for far less than the value of the property, usually at
sheriff costs alone. Upset prices in use by courts 16 is illustrative of the
fact that they too realize that the purpose of this divestiture rule has failed
of accomplishment. Nevertheless, the rule remains.
8. Bank of North America v. Fitzsimmons, 3 Binn. 342, 358 (Pa. 181i).
9. 2 Rawle 56 (Pa. 1829).
io. Id. at 66. In addition to the sheriff fee cases, additional authority was cited,
which had been handed down between the early cases and this one: Ripple v. Ripple,
i Rawle 386 (Pa. 1829); Barnet v. Washebaugh, 16 S. & R. 410 (Pa. 1827); Com-
monwealth v. Alexander, I4 S. & R. 257 (Pa. 1826); Gause v. Wiley, 4 S. & R. 509
(Pa. I818).
II. 4 Dall. 15I (Pa. 1796). In this report of the case the court, without opinion,
held that a prior mortgage was not divested by a sale under a subsequent judgment
lien. This same case was also reported in 2 Yeates 42 (Pa. 1796) where it is much
clearer that the basis of the decision, as it is here reported, was not the common law
ground of no discharge, but that a statute was in existence preventing such a result
when a mortgage was held by certain trustees of the type involved in the case. The
first report is criticized as inaccurate by Presbyterian Corporation v. Wallace, 3 Rawle
109, 134 (Pa. 1831).
12. Weidler v. Farmers Bank, iI S. & R. 134 (Pa. 1824) ; see Gilmore v. Com-
monwealth, I7 S. & R. 276, 278 (Pa. 1828).
13. 3 Rawle log (Pa. 1831). It is interesting to note that this case was decided
after the statute of 183o had been enacted, but concerned itself with facts which had
arisen prior to the passage of the statute. However, the court went out of its way to
show disfavor to the statute.
14. Id. at 134. Also noted were Willard v. Morris, I P. & W. 480 (Pa. 183o);
McLanahan v. Wyant, i P. & W. 96 (Pa. 1829).
15. Presbyterian Corporation v. Wallace, 3 Rawle lO9, 136 (Pa. 1831).
16. Emhardt, Recent Develolnnents in the Law of Mortgage Foreclosure, The
Legal Intelligencer, July ig, 1940, p. I, col. 3.
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To circumvent in part the effect of these decisions, 17 and thus to pro-
tect some prior lienholders, a statute was passed in 1830: Is "That from and
after the passage of this act, where the lien of a mortgage upon real estate
is or shall be prior to all other liens upon the same property except other
mortgages, ground rents, and the purchase money due the commonwealth,
the lien of such mortgage shall not be destroyed." This statute thus pro-
tected from divestiture by a sheriff sale under a junior encumbrance mort-
gages prior to all other liens, and mortgages immediately subsequent to
listed exceptions. But when there existed other liens prior to the mortgage
which themselves were subject to discharge, it was considered that the
mortgagee was not entitled to this privilege. Based upon the Pennsylvania
common-law view there was abundant reason for this limitation. For the
mortgagee "was bound already to vigilance against the older lien . .
it added nothing to his risk to require him to keep awake as to any younger
one". 9
Statutory interpretation is occasionally a difficult question, but under
this statute no intricate problems were presented. A senior mortgagee,
however, claimed not only that his lien remained, but that he was entitled
to share in the proceeds from a foreclosure sale under a subsequent lien.
For, he claimed, this latter right existed under common law and the statute
did not revoke it.2 0 Of course, this statute was not susceptible of that
unique construction.
In 1845 another statute 21 was passed which gave further protection
to a mortgage holder. Under this statute even if a tax charge or assess-
ment had been recorded prior to the mortgage, the mortgage would not
be destroyed by a sale under a subsequent judgment where under existing
law it would not otherwise be destroyed. The protections afforded to a
mortgagee were culminated in a statute enacted in I9oI,
2 2 and re-enacted
in 1929.2 3 Now, a mortgagee is protected if he has a mortgage on the
property prior to all other liens on the same property, or which if not prior
to all other liens is subsequent only to other mortgages, ground rents, pur-
chase money due the commonwealth, and taxes, municipal claims and
assessments which though recorded subsequent are nevertheless given pri-
17. See Lloyd, The Mortgage Theory of Pennsylvania (1924) 73 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 43.
It was the view that mortgages were only liens and so were judgments that in-
fluenced the court in saying a sale under a junior judgment sold the whole estate in the
land, and discharged all prior liens, whether mortgage or judgment. Commonwealth
v. Wilson, 34 Pa. 63, 67 (Pa. i859). While the cases on divestiture seem to bear out
the contention that Pennsylvania adopts the lien theory of mortgages, as opposed to the
title theory, in other fields of mortgage law Pennsylvania reasons as a title state would.
See Lloyd, loc. cit. supra this footnote.
18. Act of April 6, 183o, P. L. 293.
ig. Helfrich v. Weaver, 61 Pa. 385, 388 (869).
2o. Garro v. Thompson, 7 Watts 416 (Pa. 1838).
21. Act of April 16, i845, § 4, P. L. 488: "The lien of a mortgage upon any real
estate . . . shall not be destroyed, or in any way affected by any sale of the mort-
gaged premises under a subsequent judgment, (other than one entered upon a claim,
which was a lien on the premises prior to the recording of such mortgage,) by reason
of the prior lien of any tax, charge or assessment whatsoever, but the same shall con-
tinue as if such prior lien did not exist, where, by existing laws, the lien of such mort-
gage would otherwise continue: Provided, That the continuance of the lien of such
mortgage shall not prevent the discharge of such prior liens for taxes, charges or assess-
ments, by such sale, or the satisfaction thereof, out of the proceeds of such sale." North-
ern Liberties v. Swain, 13 Pa. 113 (i85o).
22. Act of May 8, 19Ol, P. L. 141, § I.
23. Act of April 30, 1929, P. L. 874, § I, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 21,
§ 651. Purdon also lists a complete history of the statutory changes and the several re-
enactments from 183o to 1929.
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ority by the law. A recent decision 24 of the Superior Court bears witness
to how firmly this divestiture policy is entrenched in Pennsylvania law.
Further modification of the rule, therefore, will come if at all only from the
legislature.
COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY
The Pennsylvania rule is almost unique at common law. Virtually
all other authorities have the opposite view and deny the discharge of
senior liens by sales under junior liens. A few have a middle-of-the-road
theory, which seems to give to the junior lienholder who initiates the sale
the option of determining whether or not the senior lien will be divested.
At the time when the Pennsylvania court thought its rule existed
since the "memory of man" or at least for "seventy" years, the English
rule was squarely contra. It was even impossible to make a senior lien-
holder a party to a foreclosure proceeding even though he requested that
he be joined.2 5 Subsequently, however, a senior lienholder was permitted
to be made a party at his desire.26 As early as 1827, the Federal rule was
in accord with the English view. 7 The Federal court was definite in its
thought that its view was the only reasonable one. "The rule is believed
to be universal, that a prior lien gives a prior claim. . . . It has never
been supposed that a subsequent mortgage could, by obtaining and ex-
ecuting a decree for the sale of the mortgaged property, obtain precedence
over a prior mortgage in which all the requirements of the law had been
observed." 28 And, "We think this is the correct rule. It is certainly
consonant with reason .... ,, 29 The court feared that an extension of
this doctrine would result in the destruction of vested interests.30
Some states in their early decisions or dicta adopted the Pennsylvania
view. But through later decisions they too became a part of the majority.
An Alabama case"' as late as 1882 made a senior lienholder a party to a
bill for foreclosure by a junior lienholder, refusing to proceed unless the
former were'joined. But in 19o6, they reverted to the customary rule,
3 2
and did not require his presence. Kentucky's view on this question is also
interesting. As dictum in Clark v. Prentice and Baxton,33 decided in 1835,
the Kentucky court glowingly justified the Pennsylvania view. "The
interest of the mortgagors and mortgagees as well as the safety and security
of purchasers, would dictate the propriety of this course. The only legal
title to the property is vested in the elder mortgagees, and cannot be passed
24. Silverman v. Keal, 135 Pa. Super. 568, 7 A. (2d) 57 (1939). This policy has
always been closely followed. Girard Life Insurance v. Farmers' and Mechanics' Na-
tional Bank, 57 Pa. 388 (1868) ; Baird v. Mashannon Coal Mining Co., 318 Pa. 63,
178 Atl. 19 (1935) ; Avalon Borough School District v. Weeks, 118 Pa. Super. 85, 179
Atl. 913 (1935).
Of course the holder of any mortgage may waive the benefits afforded him by these
statutes, and in that case the mortgage will be discharged. In re Estate of McFadden,
191 Pa. 624, 43 Atl. 383 (1899).
25. Delabre v. Norwood, 3 Swans. 158, 36 Eng. Rep. R. 8o9 (Ch. 1786) ; Parker
v. Fuller, i Russ. & My. 656, 39 Eng. Rep. R. 252 (Ch. 1830).
26. Wickenden v. Rayson, 6 De G. M. & G. 210, 43 Eng. Rep. R. 1212 (Ch.
1855). See Note (186o) 8o At. Dec. 709.
27. Rankin v. Scott, r2 Wheat. 177 (U. S. 1827) (Marshall, C. J.).
28. Id. at 179.
29. Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U. S. 734, 737 (1876).
3o. Hanna v. State Trust Co., 70 Fed. 2 (C. C. A. 8th, 1895). While this case
deals with another field, that of equity receiverships and their power of foreclosure,
this same principle seems applicable.
31. Harwell v. Lehman, 72 Ala. 344 (1882).
32. Jefferson County Savings Bank v. Miller, 145 Ala. 237, 40 So. 513 (19o6).
33. 3 Dana 469 (Ky. 1835).
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to the purchaser without having them before the court. If each of several
successive mortgagees could have a decree of sale in his separate suit, there
would be no confidence in judicial sales, the property would be sacrificed
to the injury of debtor and creditor, and the rights of purchasers involved
in uncertainty and doubt." This language would do credit to any Penn-
sylvania court. Yet, today, this dictum is definitely not followed.34  One
state, Delaware,3 5 follows the Pennsylvania view, arguing as it must to
support that ruling, that inconvenience to the one, the senior lienholder, is
necessary and overweighed by the benefit to the public. No Pennsylvania
decisions are cited as influencing the Delaware approach; they seem to
have reached their conclusion independently. Rhode Island,38 too, may
probably be classified with Delaware in this minority.
Included within the majority are Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
37
The reasons supporting this construction were well stated by the Illinois
court in Pritchard v. Fruit.8 "Such a purchaser is by the sale substituted
to all the rights of the mortgagor in the premises, but to nothing more.
The sale [in the case of mortgages] is of the equity of redemption, and the
purchaser takes it with the burden, and he is supposed to fix the price he
34. West v. Criscillis, 242 Ky. 549, 46 S. W. (2d) 1082 (932) ; Bank of Tolles-
boro v. W. T. Rawleigh Co., 238 Ky. 516, 293 S. W. 3o39 (Ky. 1927); Fisher v.
Evans, 175 Ky. 300, 94 S. W. 363 (917).
35. Farmers' Bank v. Wallace, 3 Har. 370 (Del. 1844), definitely favors the
Pennsylvania view for they say at 372: "It is the policy of the law to disencumber
lands as much as possible from all liens, which a sale could possibly remove; and
though there may be some inconvenience in the application of the proceeds of the sale
to prior judgments, it seems to us the inconvenience must be greater in selling subject
to prior judgments; even those which do not happen to be due at the time of the
sale." Isaacs v. Messick, i Mary. 259, 4o Atl. og (Del. Super. 1894) is a later case
supporting this stand, but since it deals with chattels and cites no authorities, it cannot
be relied on as authority.
36. Zimmerman v. Andrews, 51 R. I. 204, 153 Atl. 307 (1931), but this case like
the Delaware case mentioned supra in note 36, deals with personalty, and it is not
certain that the same rules are applicable to realty.
37. Citations for the various states are given in the same order in which they
appear in the text: White v. Holman, 32 Ark. 753 (1878); Van Loben Sels v.
Bunnell, 13 Cal. 489, 63 Pac. 773 (39oi) ; Chester v. Wheelwright, i5 Conn. 56a
(3843); Pennock v. Caldwell, 116 Fla. 626, i56 So. 743 (i934) ; Broward v. Hoeg,
i5 Fla. 370 (3875) ; Kirby v. Reese, 69 Ga. 452 (1882) ; Gregory v. Suburban Realty
Co., 292 Ill. 568, 327 N. E. 339 (i92o); Romberg v. McCormick, 95 Ill. App. 309
(1900), i94 Ill. 205, 62 N. E. 537 (I9O2); Case v. Bartholow, 23 Kan. 300 (1878) ;
Gomez v. Courcelle, 8 La. App. 304' (1853); Tome v. Merchants & M. P. B. & L. Co.,
34 Md. 32 (i87o); Dawson v. Danbury Bank, i5 Mich. 489 (1867); Dickerson v.
Bridges, 147 Mo. 235, 48 S. W. 825 (i898); Forrer v. Kloke & Koch, 3o Neb. 373
(i88o) ; Hudnit & Slater v. Nash, i6 N. J. Eq. 550 (Ct. Errors & App. 1862);
Smith v. Pure Strains Farm Co., i8o App. Div. 703, 167 N. Y. Supp. 877 (4th Dep't
1917); Emigrant Industrial Savings Bk. v. Goldman, 75 N. Y. 127 (3878); Lewis v.
Smith, 9 N. Y. 502 (3854) ; Giesy v. Aurora State Bank, 122 Oreg. 1, 255 Pac. 467
(1927); Union National Bk. of Columbia v. Cook, iio S. C. 99, 96 S. E. 484 (xgi8);
Simmons v. Tillery & Wilson, i Tenn. 274 (i8o8) ; Garza v. Howell, 37 Tex. Civ.
App. 585, 85 S. W. 461 (39o5); Buzzell v. Still, 63 Vt. 490, 22 Atl. 639 (38gi);
Simmons Auto Co. v. Pursley, 114 W. Va. 168, 373 S. E. 255 (3933) ; Strobe v.
Downer, 33 Wis. 10 (i86o); Raymond v. Holbern, 23 Wis. 57 (1868).
Various general authorities may be consulted in this field: 3 JONES, MORTGAGES
(8th ed. 1928) § 2o0; PoMEsoY, CoDE REmErIES (5th ed. 3929) § 239; STORY, EQUITY
PLADiNG (Ioth ed. 3892) § 393; 2 WILTSIE, MORTGAGE Fo~cLo SuRE (5th ed. 1939)
§782; 43 C. P. 892-893; Note (i86o) 8o Am. DEc. 709.
38. 208 Ill. App. 77, 82 (917).
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pays at the sale, with reference to the incumbrance on the property, and
subject to which he purchases. He no doubt deducts from the value of
the property the amount of the mortgage debt and then regulates his bid
with reference to the value above the incumbrance. . .. On such a sale,
the purchaser has notice of the incumbrance, and expects to get back his
money on a redemption, or to acquire the equity of redemption and by
discharging the lien, to become the owner of the fee. . . . The principle
of caveat emptor applies in such sales, and the purchaser must be bound by
his acts unless misled by fraud."
Most of these jurisdictions also permit a senior mortgagee whose debt
is due and owing to join in a foreclosure sale if he so desires. 9 Some
states, however, while essentially adopting the majority rule as to divesti-
ture seek to follow a middle-of-the-road theory. In Indiana,40 a prior lien,
if the lienor is not joined, remains prior. But, regardless of his consent,
the prior lienor may be joined as a party to the suit, and his rights become
adjudicated. This, of course, puts the option of divestitude upon the
junior lienholder. A public market for foreclosure sales is not being safe-
guarded by vesting in a junior lienholder this extraordinary power. Thus
the reasons for the minority rule do not support this deviation. Never-
theless, Mississippi 41 follows Indiana, and it is not improbable 42 that this
situation prevails in Iowa and North Carolina.
COMmON-LAW EXCEPTIONS TO THE PENNSYLVANIA RULE
As the foreword attempted to indicate, Pennsylvania both at common
law and by statutes has exceptions to the doctrine of divestiture of all liens
at sheriff sale. The courts were early called upon to determine the effect
of a sale by a junior lienholder where his lien was preceded by an interest
undivested at common law and by a mortgage subsequent thereto. Under
the exact words of the statute the mortgage lien was capable of discharge,
for it was neither prior nor secondary to one of the statutory exceptions.
However, a solution was readily forthcoming which protected a lien in
that situation. It was held that any lien, the existence of which prior to a
mortgage would cause it to be divested by a sheriff's sale, must be such as
was divested at common law, and thrown upon the fund. Thus the first
lien would not now be divested, and the mortgage would also be saved.
The interests excepted at common law were called incumbrances or
estates 43 to distinguish them from mortgages and other liens. Ground
rents 44 and dower 45 were thus protected, but their arrearages were
39. White v. Holman, 32 Ark. 753 (1878); Van Loben Sels v. Bunnell, 131 Cal.
489, 63 Pac. 773 (igoi); Gregory v. Suburban Realty Co., 292 Ill. 568, 127 N. E.
11g (192o); Emigrant Industrial Savings Bk. v. Goldman, 75 N. Y. 127 (1878).
See 8o (i86o) Am. DEC. 709; ig R. C. L. (917) 529; 6 R. C. L. (Perm. Supp. 1929)
468o.
4o. Masters v. Templeton, 92' Ind. 447 (1883); Moffitt v. Roche, 77 Ind. 48
(1881).
41. Waters v. Bossel, 58 Miss. 6o2 (1881).
42. It is possible to say only "probable", for though the language of the cases seem
to indicate such a result, there is neither a decision, nor even a strong dictum actually
so holding. See Paulsen v. Jensen, 209 Iowa 453, 456, 228 N. W. 357, 358 (1929) ;
Kochs v. Jackson, 156 N. C. 326, 329, 72 S. E. 382, 383 (1911) ; Hinson & Comming
v. Adrian & Vollers, 86 N. C. 61, 63 (1882).
43. Helfrich v. Weaver, 61 Pa. 385 (1869) ; Pancoast v. Hagaman, 4 Leg. & Ins.
Rep. 75, col. I (Pa. 1862).
44. Pancoast v. Hagaman, 4 Leg. & Ins. Rep. 75, col. i (Pa. 1862).
45. Helfrich v. Weaver, 6I Pa. 385 (1869).
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not.46 "It has undoubtedly been held that though the charge itself may be
a fixed lien, incapable of divestiture because incapable of computation, the
rule is different as to any arrears that may be due at the time of the sheriff's
sale, because arrears are ascertainable with certainty in amount, and there-
fore payable out of the fund." 47 A perplexing situation arose where
arrears of ground rent were followed by a first mortgage and a subsequent
incumbrance on which a sale was had. One argument proposed divesting
the arrearage since it was acknowledge to be only a lien, and thus the
mortgage would fall with it. However, the court realized that to do that
would take away from the mortgagee in this position, the protection
afforded by the act of 183o. For the laches of the mortgagor create this
new lien, and if given precedence over the mortgage, it would cause the
hold of the mortgage "upon the land to be unloosed whenever a sheriff's
sale should be effected under a judgment subsequently obtained". 48 Thus
the mortgage was permitted to remain. Then, since the sale was subject
to a fixed lien, the mortgage, all prior liens also remained. 49 Thus the
arrearage is not divested. The same result is had where there is an
arrearage of one ground rent, a second ground rent, and a sale on a sub-
ordinate judgment. 50 The fixed lien of the second ground rent saves the
prior one, of arrearage. The reasoning differs, however, in that the second
ground rent is protected not by statute but at common law.
The lien of a creditor on decedent's property is another incumbrance
afforded protection. 5' Upon a sale by a subsequent creditor of the heir,
the creditors of the decedent are not divested of their rights against the
decedent's property. This was necessary of course to protect those cred-
itors who, under Pennsylvania law, could collect debts due from decedent
out of the land, if personalty was insufficient. A devise to a child "to have
her living out of the land", 52 was also considered of such an interest in
the land as not to be cut off. Departing from charges of this nature, the
court has always guarded a mortgage to the commonwealth for purchase
money.53 The court openly acknowledged that this result was reached on
the grounds of expediency alone, not because the purchase money mort-
gage partook of an interest in the land. "The state has always looked to
the land as debtor. Nor has it ever confided the receipt or custody of its
moneys to any but its particular officers or agents. Here, if the lien were
divested, the public interest would be put to the hazard of the sheriff's
insolvency, which sometimes occasions loss even to individuals notwith-
standing extreme diligence by the losers. The Commonwealth necessarily
performs its operations by the instrumentality of agents, and consequently
with less vigilance than is infused by self interest into the operation of an
individual . . . so that the same consideration would seem to entitle it to
a more indulgent construction in other matters, than could be claimed by
an individual." "
46. Foulke v. Millard, io8 Pa. 230 (1885); Dickinson v. Beyer, 87 Pa. 274
(1878). See ROBEY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 210.
47. Dickinson v. Beyer, 87 Pa. 274, 281 (1878).
48. Devine's Appeal, 3o Pa. 348, 351 (1858).
49. Miller v. Freedberg, 24 North. 14 (Pa. C. P. 1932) ; Tower's Appropriation,
9 W. & S. lO3 (Pa- 1845); Green v. Watrous, 17 S. & R. 393 (Pa. 1828).
5o. Hacker v. Cozzens, 92 Pa. 461 (188o).
51. Horner & Roberts v. Hasbrouck, 41 Pa. 169 (1861).
52. Steele v. Walter, 204 Pa. 257 (1903).
53. Duncan v. Reiff, 3 P. & W. 368 (Pa. 1832).
54. Id. at 369.
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There is one case that protected an easement from being cut off at a
sheriff's sale.55 It was regarded as an interest in the land and thus as
another exception to the Pennsylvania doctrine. This decision is entirely
justifiable but on different grounds.- It is not clear from the decision
whether or not the sale was made subject thereto; if such were the case the
easement could be treated as a fixed lien. But surely even that rea-
soning is bad, for an easement is an interest in land entirely distinguish-
able from the interests or charges so far considered. An easement is not a
security device, nor is it designed to be a charge until certain conditions or
payments are forthcoming. The purchaser buying with notice of this prop-
erty interest knows it cannot be divested by payment in order of its priority
and therefore is subject thereto. This seems a more logical analysis. If
followed, it would remove easements from classification within this list of
exceptions.
Of course, if prior liens other than the common-law and statutory
exceptions precede a mortgage, the mortgage lien is divested.56 But if
the lien or preference arises only after the sale, the mortgage lien remains
outstanding. This is evident for "the sale imparts to certain classes of
liens the peculiar quality of a preferred lien on the proceeds; but it does
not give to the lien the retroactive effect of divesting mortgage liens" which
are the first lien of record.51 The situation where a subsequently recorded
lien is given priority by law is markedly different. For this priority occurs
even before sale. An interesting problem arose in a lower court upon a
sale under a mechanics' lien given priority by law. The land was also
burdened with a single mortgage covering both purchase money and
advances made after the registration of the mechanics' lien. A statute
entitled the purchase money mortgage to proceeds from any foreclosure
sale in advance of a lien given priority by law. The proceeds, therefore,
could hardly be disbursed without divesting the purchase part of the mort-
gage and the balance of the mortgage being a subsequent lien was of course
discharged under the sale.58
REcORDING SYSTEM ODDITIES
Intricate problems arose from a sale under a lien subsequent to a
mortgage, when the mortgage in turn was subsequent to a first lien, either
void on its face, or in fact paid and not satisfied of record. Two policy
arguments converge in this situation: that of the recording system to make
the record determinative, and that of the divestiture rule affording protec-
tion to purchasers at sheriff sales. Where a judgment and a mortgage or
two mortgages are recorded at the same time 1, or on the same day,60
neither is considered prior. Therefore a sale on a subsequent lien dis-
charges both prior liens. The only exception is a purchase money mort-
gage, Here the Pennsylvania doctrine of instantaneous seisin operates to
make that mortgage prior and save it from discharge. Where a first
judgment has actually been paid, but not satisfied of record, the mortgage,
even though in fact it is entitled to protection under the Pennsylvania
55. Overdeer v. Updegraff, 69 Pa. iio (1871).
56. See general authorities cited supra note 3.
57. First National Bank of Mahanoy City v. Sheafer, i49 Pa. 236 (1892).
58. Reed v. Kimble, i Del. 461 (Pa. C. P. 1883).
59. Bonstein v. Schweyer, 212 Pa. ig, 6I Atl. 447 (9o5), 53 Am. L. or. 772.
6o. Home Savings Fund v. King, 113 Pa. Super. 400, 173 At!. 891 (1934).
382 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
statutes, is divested. 61 The result is harsh, but the purchaser is entitled
to rely on the record. Sometimes the state of the record favors the mort-
gagee. This occurred when a mortgage was subsequent to a judgment
lien, but it was not apparent from the record that the judgment had been
revived. Thus the mortgage was the first lien of record, and the purchaser
took subject to the mortgage.6 2 If the purchaser does know of the exist-
ence of any of these facts, he should be held responsible for them, and
should not be entitled to rely on what the apparent record is, for he knows
otherwise.
In Reynolds v. Miller,6 a mortgagee recorded a first mortgage while
a building was being constructed. A mechanics' lien was subsequently
recorded and took precedence by law. Later there was a sale under a
subsequent lien. The purchaser took free and clear of the mortgage, be-
cause it was apparent from the record that the mechanics' lien had priority.
Another case in the same circumstances, where it was not apparent from
the record that the lien had priority, held that the purchaser took subject
to the mortgage. 4 Both results are of course reconcilable with the policy
to permit the purchaser to take just what he thinks he is buying and no
more. Exactly in line with this reasoning, courts hold that where a first
lien is void on its face,6 5 a mortgage subsequently recorded is not discharged
by a sale under a subordinate lien.
Where a sale is had under a judgment secured under the bond ac-
companying a mortgage, for whole or part of the debt due for which the
mortgage is security, the mortgage is divested. 6  It is as if the sale has
been directly made under proceedings upon the mortgage security itself.
Both before and since the act of I83O, such sale discharges the lien of a
first mortgage. This rule extends to judgments taken in the same fashion
for interest due 67 under the mortgage. However, such a judgment merely
recorded is not divested by a sale under a junior judgment, for "there is
a clear union of the mortgage and judgment on the bond secured by it.
. . . the judgment necessarily relates back to the date of the lien of the
mortgage". 68 This result is reconcilable with recording system policy.
The cases do not seem to bother with a rationale, but one is available. The
mortgage as well as the judgment remains unsatisfied of record, so that
even if the purchaser thought the judgment would be divested, he would
know that the mortgage remained. But if the mortgage was not recorded
until after the judgment had been indexed, would the same result be
justifiable, since on the face of the record the purchaser would think both
liens would be discharged?
It was early held that a sale of real estate on a judgment secured for
arrears of taxes did not discharge the lien of a first mortgage recorded
61. Warren Pearl Works v. Rappaport, 303 Pa. 235, I54 Ati. 587 (193');
Saunders v. Gould, 134 Pa. 445, ig Atl. 694 (189o) ; Magaw v. Garrett, 25 Pa. 39
(1885).
62. Reap v. Battle, 4 Kulp. 453 (Pa. 1887).
63. 177 Pa. 168, 35 Atl. 702 0896).
64. Eckels v. Stuart, 212 Pa. 161, 6I Atl. 820 (1905), 53 Am. L. REG 771.
65. Geopp v. Gartiser, 35 Pa. 130 (i86o).
66. Pierce v. Potter, 7 Watts 475 (Pa. 1838); McGrew v. McLanahan & Drum,
i P. & W. 44 (Pa. 1829); McCall v. Lenox, 9 S. & R. 3o4 (Pa. 1823); see Common-
wealth v. Wilson, 34 Pa. 63, 67 (1849).
67. West Branch Bank v. Chester, ii Pa. 282 (1849).
68. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 34 Pa. 63, 68 0859), overruling, Whitehead v.
Purnell, 2 Miles 434 (Pa. 1840); Cross v. Stahlman, 43 Pa. 129 (1862).
NOTES
TAX SALES
prior to the date of the assessment of taxes on which the judgment was
founded. 69 Under the Act of 1923 70 this view is still followed as regards
the first sale for taxes. But under this statute, which applies to all classes
of cities, such liens even though prior, are divested when a certain pro-
cedure detailed in the statute is followed exactly. "In case the property
be not sold for a sum sufficient to pay all taxes and municipal claims,
together with the costs thereon, the plaintiff in such claim may postpone
the sale . . . and file his petition setting forth that more than one year
has elapsed since the filing of his claim; that he has exposed the property
to sheriff's sale thereunder, and was unable to obtain a bid sufficient to pay
the upset price in full . . . that said property [may then] be sold at a
subsequent sheriff's sale day . . . clear of all claims, liens, mortgages,
and estates . . . and the purchaser at such sale shall take . . . an
absolute title." 71
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in City of Erie v. Piece of Land,
72
had no trouble holding this statute constitutional. The opinions of the
majority and the dissent differed only on its retroactive effect. Applied
prospectively the statute is good. There are valid reasons, practically, to
support these statutory provisions. Revenue is the life's blood of any
governing body, and this is one means of securing that income.7 3 The
creditor is still afforded protection by making payment of the taxes if he
desires to protect his interest. Individual rights are being sacrificed for
the benefit of the community. This practice has been followed in all of
Pennsylvania divestiture law, and is commendable theory. And the statute
of I929 74 providing for no discharge where the mortgage is prior was held
not to conflict with the statute of 1923. The latter statute "is a particular
enabling act providing a complete system of procedure for the collection
of taxes and specifically a method of selling upon a tax lien in a manner
that will divest all claims, mortgages, charges, and estates, after giving
the holders thereof . . . opportunity to be heard. The act of 1929, in-
voked . . . as a repealer of the act of 1923, is general legislation for the
divestiture of liens. In the absence of express words of repeal, it can not
affect a previous particular statute." ,5 This seems extremely logical. The
Act of 1929 governs procedure and discharge under the first tax sale which
is only an ordinary sheriff sale. The act of 1923 governs the second sale.
Another tax statute passed in 1931 76 is applicable only to the cities
of the third class. This authorizes another method to collect delinquent
taxes. The treasurer of said cities to secure payment of past due taxes
may order a sale. Gordon v. Harrisburg" held that these sales did not
divest liens of first mortgages recorded prior to the assessment of the tax
for which the sale is made. The statute had to state clearly that complete
divestiture was desired in order for the court to be sure that the general
69. See Olyphant v. Egreski, 29 Pa. Super. 116, 119-120 (io5).
70. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, I931) tit. 53, § 2051.
71. Ibid.
72. 14 A. (2d) 428 (Pa. 194o), 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. I"9.
73. See (194o) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 119, M21.
74. See note 23 mipra.
75. School District v. McClane Mining Co., 85 Pitts. L. J. 125, 127 (Pa. 1937).
76. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1938) tit. 53, § 12198-2575 to § 12198-2586.
77. i9 D. & C. 47 (Pa. 1933), aff'd, 314 Pa. 70, 171 Atl. 277 (1934).
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policy of the former statute of 1929 preserving the lien of a first mortgage
was to be contradicted.
CONCLUSION
There is little to justify the rule of complete divestiture. Its purpose
of course was to promote spirited bidding by conveying title at foreclosure
sales free from all incumbrances. This has failed of accomplishment. In
addition, the basic reasoning of the Pennsylvania rule has been disputed
almost unanimously. Entire protection to a senior lienholder is held to
overbalance the danger of lack of purchasers at forced sales. Of course
statutory exceptions have brought Pennsylvania closer to the majority rule.
Nevertheless, due to common-law policy, intricacies have arisen. It is nec-
essary to discover common-law exceptions, statutory exceptions, and then
to determine their combined effect on the divestiture rule. However, in
reaching complete divestiture in sales for tax arrearages, Pennsylvania has
taken a step forward. This rule is justifiable in these sales, because of a
different balance of equities. Further protection to senior lienholders is
still desired, and the only method available to achieve this result is by stat-
utory modification.
M. C.
